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THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ON NATIONAL EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
ROBERT LINKE*
INTRODUCTION
HE PURPOSE OF this paper is to show the importance of the
the European Convention on Human Rights1 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Convention) in influencing national jurispru-
dence and national legislation. Thus, it seemed advisable to make
a survey of some of the relevant and steadily increasing decisions of
the European Commission and of the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights (both created under the Convention). The
main concern of this work is to examine the fair trial safeguards in
criminal proceedings as contained in article 6 para. 1 and 3, and
partly in article 5 of the Convention. The piece will also consider
possible implications on extradition and international legal assistance
in criminal matters. As only procedural rights will be examined,
questions of substantive penal law arising out of the Convention, such
as the right to compensation for those arrested or detained, the pre-
sumption of innocence, or the retroactivity of criminal law, and the
prohibition of the extensive application of criminal law by analogy
will not be discussed.
The rights under articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, pertaining
to criminal proceedings, are among those which are most frequently
invoked before the Strasbourg organs. The "habeas corpus" func-
tion of the Convention tends to predominate. This is confirmed by
the applications declared admissible by the European Commission
(as of December 31, 1967 there were 49) and especially by the.
nature of the cases brought before the European Court of Human
* MR. LINKE is Deputy Legal Advisor, Ministry of Justice, Vienna, Austria.
1. European Convention of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, signed
at Rome Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. [hereinafter cited as Convention]
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Rights. Of the eight cases decided so far by the court, all, except
the case concerned with Belgium's linguistic problem, have had to
do with some phase of criminal law and procedure: detention on the
remand in Ireland; forms of punishment and proceedings in cassation
in Belgium; the requirements of a fair trial in Denmark; the reason-
able length of criminal proceedings and some aspects of the "equality
of arms" in Austria; and the reasonable length of detention on remand
in Germany and Austria. The Convention anticipates a "common
standard" of fair administration of justice in the member states of the
Council of Europe, for in the last paragraph of the preamble the
Convention is described as an expression of the common European
heritage.2 This demonstrates the conviction of the draftsmen of the
text of the Convention that the different systems of criminal proceed-
ings in force in the member states of the Council of Europe are com-
patible with the Convention. Nevertheless, an examination of the
texts of the various codes of criminal procedure reveal remarkable
divergencies, even of provisions which are or at least should be in-
fluenced by the framework of the Convention. This scheme, as some
sort of European basic law, opens new possibilities for comparative
law studies in the fields directly affected by the Convention, and
furthermore, could be the beginning of new efforts on the part of states
in harmonizing or even unifying their laws. The prospects seem
especially favorable as far as procedural criminal law is concerned.
In this respect, the Convention could even be regarded as a fore-
runner to an international bill of procedural rights.
The Convention has contributed a great deal to the humanization
of criminal proceedings, and to the protection of the individual
against the exercise of arbitrary power by police authorities and
penal systems in general. The rights of the defense under article 6
of the Convention, and the principle that any serious doubt left in
the mind of the judge by a gap in the evidence must inevitably result
in an acquittal, will help to avoid the conviction of one who is inno-
cent.' On the other hand, we must prevent the trial safeguards from
finally becoming what was sometimes said to be true of codes of
2. Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
3. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6. Not only in England but also on the
Continent it is a basic idea to prefer the acquittal of ten guilty men rather than
risk the conviction of one who is innocent.
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criminal procedure in general, namely the "Magna Carta of crimi-
nals." Inbau has warned of the dangers of an isolated consideration
of human rights without regard to the requirements of public safety
and order.4 He mentioned, as an example, several cases where the
"exclusionary rule," developed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, has led to strange consequences. The problem for those
who have to deal with criminal law in practice will therefore consist
of finding a compromise between an effective prevention and supres-
sion of crime on the one hand and the protection of the human rights
of the individual on the other.
THE CHARACTER OF THE COURT
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention requires the court ("tribunal")
to be independent and impartial. In addition, the court must have
been established by law. The latter provision is directed mainly at
ad hoc or special tribunals. 6 The doubts as to the guarantees of a
fair trial before these courts led some of the contracting parties to the
European Convention on Extradition7 to make reservations whereby
extradition will only be granted, if at all, under certain conditions
when the person claimed is to be brought before a special court or
when the extradition should lead to the execution of a sentence im-
posed by such a court. The text of article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
does not, however, go as far as these reservations and does not affect
special courts which are legally constituted.
In two cases the European Commission has dealt with certain as-
pects of competence. In one decision the European Commission stat-
ed that competence under the law of the state concerned is sufficient.
Therefore, there is no need to examine whether the presiding judge
4. "Das Verhidltnis zwischen wirkungsvoller Strafverfolgung und dem Grund-
rechtsschutz des Einzelnen" in ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT" p. 302 (1966).
5. A similar situation occurred in Washington, D.C.: The wife of a man living
there had disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Because there was a certain
suspicion against him, the police arrested the man and interrogated him. After sev-
eral hours he confessed to the murder and led the police to the corpse. The con-
fession could not be used as evidence because the police had failed to bring the man
before a judge immediately. The accused was acquitted.
6. See Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings as a Human
Right, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 352 (1967).
7. Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
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of the court was also competent to deal with the case in accordance
with the internal court regulations assigning the particular cases to
certain judges. Also, certain errors in constituting the jury called
upon to hear the case could lead to the conclusion that the court was
not established by law. But, as the European Commission stated,
the composition of a jury is an administrative matter which does not
concern the "establishment" of the court.8 Therefore, any such er-
ror is to be taken into account only insofar as the error caused such
prejudice to the person sentenced as would amount to a denial of
justice. In a case before the European Commission, three jurors had
been admitted, by mistake, as principal jurors although they did not
appear on the list of such jurors. The European Commission held
that the mistake did in no way affect the outcome of the trial and
rejected the application in accordance with article 27 para. 2 of the
Convention.
The meaning of the requirement "impartial" was explained by the
European Commission in the decision of Wemhoff v. the Federal
Republic of Germany9 wherein it held that allegations of mere specu-
lative inference are not enough. There must be at least some evi-
dence indicating that the court failed to act impartially, and that it
adopted a hostile or biased attitude against the accused at the trial,
that the trial was otherwise conducted unfairly, or that the con-
viction was arrived at by any reasoning not based on the evidence
before the court.' 0 It is clear that such an attitude of the court can
amount also to a violation of the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of a "fair trial" in general.
On the other hand, a court cannot be considered biased if the
severity of the sentence imposed is based on the existence of previous
convictions and not on an unjust or partial attitude on the part of the
8. Coll. 11, p. 31.
9. "Application No. 2868168" [1967] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
10. In its report, the European Commission, pointing out the importance of the
spirit in which the judge must carry out his task, used rather similar terms: The
judge should not start with the conviction or assumption that the accused committed
the act with which he is charged. The onus falls upon the prosecution,
and any doubt is to the benefit of the accused. The judge must permit the
accused to produce evidence in rebuttal. In his judgment, he can find him
guilty only on the basis of direct or indirect evidence sufficiently strong in the eyes
of the law to establish his guilt. See note 11 inf ra.
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judge," or if the court can base its decision on "established and ap-
propriate" jurisprudence. 12
The principles formulated in the Wemhoff decision were apparently
applied in a subsequent case, Boeckmans v. Belgium.
In this case, the applicant was sentenced by a Brussels Court to two years imprison-
ment and to pay a fine for stealing valuables of a widow nearly 80 years of age.
He maintained before the court that the things had been given to him by the wo-
man because of "special relations" he claimed to have had with her. The president
of the chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeal, when presenting his report, des-
cribed this defense as "scandalous," "mendacious," "disgraceful" and "distasteful."
He pointed out that, should the accused maintain this defense, the court would
have to consider whether the sentence passed by the lower court was adequate.'
3
The Commission did not reject the application since a possible
violation of article 6 para. 1 of the Convention could not be excluded.
Subsequently, in the course of an "amicable settlement," the parties
reached an agreement leaving the sentence unchanged, but a sum of
money was paid to the applicant "as adequate reparation for his
injury. ' 1
One could argue that the Convention guarantees the accused the
right to an impartial tribunal without any reservation up to the very
close of the proceedings, and that the accused is entitled to challenge
the judge at any stage of the proceedings. However, in one decision
the Commission has accepted certain limitations of the right to
challenge propter affectum:
Reference was made to Article 21 par. [sic 2 of the Austrian Judicial Organization
Act according to which the right of challenge does not apply when the party allegedly
injured continues to take part in the hearing. The Commission accepted the inten-
tion of the Austrian legislator to prevent, by this limitation, the course of law being
constantly interrupted by interlocutory judgments.15
The challenge of the judge is not the only domestic remedy to be
exhausted by the applicant according to article 26 of the Convention.
In addition, the accused must have tried to have the case transferred
to another court.16
11. "Karl-Heinz Wemhoff Against The Federal Republic of Germany" Case,
[19671 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 460 (Individual Application).
12. Coll. 6, p. 41.
13. "Against Belgium" [1963] Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 370.
14. "Having Reached A Friendly Settlement" [1965] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 410 (report of the sub-commission).
15. "Application No. 556159" Case, [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
288 (Individual Application).
16. "Austria Against Italy" [1963] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
740 (cases before the Committee of Ministers).
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THE MINIMUM RIGHTS OF DEFENSE IN A FAIR TRIAL
The rights of the accused in the conduct of his defense in con-
formity with a fair administration of justice are listed in article 6
para. 3. The list consists of the "minimum" rights which should be
available and as such is not exhaustive.
For example, there is the right to be informed of the nature and
the cause of the accusation. 17  This provision sets forth the right of
a person to be informed of the reasons of arrest. It is clear that the
information to which a person is entitled, concerning the charges
made against him, must be more specific and more detailed in con-
nection with his right to a fair trial under article 6 than in connec-
tion with his right to liberty and security of person under article 5.1s
Article 6 para. 3(a) does not relate solely to arrested persons but
applies to any person "charged with a criminal offense." This indi-
cates that the indictment must transpire after the end of the prelimi-
nary investigation because only at this stage will the judicial authori-
ties be able to state in detail the factual and legal reasons on which
they intend to base their decision. 9
"Cause" refers to the grounds or facts upon which the accusation
is based, and "nature" refers to the legal qualification of the facts.
The information required under article 6 para. 3 (a) must cover both,
and must "enable the accused to prepare his defense. 20  For ex-
ample, the prosecution would have to inform the accused in time
whether it intends to prosecute either for "having instigated or plan-
ned" offenses committed by another person, or for having done so by
hypnotic influence exercised on the perpetrator. The accused ob-
viously would have to conduct his defense differently depending on
the charge. 2'
17. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6, para. 3(a).
18. "Application No. 343157" [1959] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
412.
19. ("D'une manire dt taillge". There is, however, no obligation to indicate
the reasons in "minute" detail. "Against Federal Republic of Germany" Case,
[1963] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 520 (Individual Applications).
20. "Ofner Against Austria" [19601 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
322 (Individual Applications).
21. "Nielsen Against Denmark" [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
494 (extracts from the report of the European Commission of Human Rights).
The use of the word "instigation" in the indictment was in the view of
the Commission sufficient to cover the concept of hypnotic influence. The Com-
[Vol. XXI:397
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The information must be in a language which the accused under-
stands. This requirement has consequences also for international
assistance in criminal matters, because a state requested to effect
service of foreign writs-particularly indictments or summonses-
upon an accused who does not understand the foreign language, may
refuse to comply with the request if there is no translation attached
to the writ.
Another right which an accused individual has under the Conven-
tion is adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense.22
There is a logical connection between this right and the right
under article 6 para. 3 (a).2 In the case of Koplinger v. Austria,24
the European Commission declared admissible an application in
which the Applicant complained, inter alia, of a violation of this
right, i.e., adequate time and facilities.
He alleged that he had not had time to prepare his defense properly, that the writ-
ten communications he had addressed to his defense counsel had been transmitted
belatedly by the prison authorities, that the length of his personal conversations with
his counsel had been limited by these authorities, and that the counsel had not en-
joyed the necessary facilities for following the course of the investigations. As
there was a change in the person of the ex-offo counsel several times before and
after the trial, the Commission considered also whether these changes could have
prejudiced the facilities necessary for the preparation of the defense. 2 5
In its final report of October 1, 1968, the European Commission,
having considered the merits of the case, found no violation of the
Convention. It pointed out that only one counsel had assisted the
accused at the decisive stage of the proceedings, namely at the trial,
and that only one counsel had prepared the appeal and represented
the accused in the hearing before the Austrian Supreme Court.26 The
European Commission criticized the Austrian legal provisions appli-
cable in the case according to which it was possible to designate an
ex-offo counsel (Armenvertreter) separately for each stage of the
mission also took account of the fact that the applicant had been examined by a
psychiatrist before the trial. This examination gave him a sufficient indication
that the prosecution might argue that hypnosis had been used.
22. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6, para. 3(b).
23. Supra note 15, at 323.
24. "Rudolf Koplinger Against Austria" [1966] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 240 (Individual Application).
25. "Armenvertreter" (appointed counsel for paupers).
26. This counsel had stated as a witness that he had had the necessary time and
facilities to prepare the defence.
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proceedings. This legislation has been changed 7 to the effect that
only one and the same ex-officio counsel can conduct the defense until
the end of the proceedings.
"Facilities" refers to access to documents, and it has been deter-
mined that access to the case file eight days before the trial is suffi-
cient."' Further, an accused who is assisted by a defending counsel,
whether a defense attorney or simply a person acting on the accused's
behalf, cannot complain that only his counsel had the possibility to
consult the case file because the rights guaranteed by the Convention
are both those of the accused and of the defense in general. -1
Also, communication between the accused and his counsel is neces-
sary for the preparation of the defense. 0 This right is, however, not
violated by reason of the fact that the accused is not given an oppor-
tunity to talk to his lawyer about his case when there is nothing to
prevent him from corresponding with his lawyer before the case is
heard.3 In general, a short time for the preparation of the defense
constitutes a violation of the Convention only when, as a result, the
accused has suffered prejudice in the proceedings.12  Likewise, in
the interest of a proper defense, article 7 para. 3 of the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters provides for
a declaration by which a contracting state may request "that service
of a summons on an accused person who is in its territory be trans-
mitted to its authorities by a certain time before the date set for
appearance.""
27. Federal law of July 18, 1962 (Strafprozebnovelle 1962).
28. "Against Austria" [19631 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 194
(Individual Applications).
29. Supra note 15. "A defending counsel . . . is entitled .. . to the rights
mentioned in the said par. 3 since these rights are intended to ensure the proper
defence of the accused. . . . [I]n order to determine whether the right to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence has been respected,
account must be taken of the general situation of the defence and not only of the
situation of the accused."
30. See Study of The Right of Arrested Persons to Communicate with those
Whom it is Necessary for them to Consult in order to Ensure their Defense or to
Protect their Essential Interests drafted by the COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 25/R. I of 7 (January, 1969).
31. Supra note 28.
32. Coll. 22, p. 96.
33. This period shall not, according to this provision, exceed 50 days.
Declarations to this effect have been made by Austria, Denmark, France, Israel,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. As for the text of the Convention see
[1959] EUROP. T.S. No. 30.
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By article 6 para. 3(c) of the Convention everyone charged with
a criminal offense has the right "to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing, or if he has not sufficient means
to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require." Free legal assistance is guaranteed only if three
conditions are met: the accused must be "charged" with a criminal
offense; 4 the accused must not have sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance of his own choosing; and the interests of justice must re-
quire that the accused be given the assistance. Except for cases
covered by article 6, the Convention does not recognize the right to
legal assistance as being one to which all persons are entitled and the
refusal of which by the competent authorities would in itself amount
to a breach of the Convention.3" Hence, in general the state has the
right to exclude lawyers from appearing before courts,30 subject to
the limitations imposed by article 6 para. 3 (c).
The term "legal assistance" does not necessarily mean that the
accused has a right to representation by a lawyer. The term includes
also a probationary lawyer undergoing governmental training."
Further, article 6 para. 3 (c) offers no right to free legal assistance in
order to bring proceedings against other persons,3 s and no right for
the accused to choose the lawyer who will assist him free of charge.39
Finally, there is no violation of the Convention if the lawyer designated
to assist the accused refuses to do so. 40
34. "Application No. 833160" [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
428 (Individual Applications). As to the procedural stage at which the
accused can be, at the earliest, considered as "charged" see text infra.
35. "No. 265157, No. 89/55, No. 127155, No. 134/55, No. 189/56"
[1955-1956-1957] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 192, 226, 230, 232, 236
(Decision).
36. "Against The Federal Republic of Germany" Case, [1962] Y.B. EUR. CONv.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 104 (Individual Application).
37. Case, [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 114. The defense had
been conducted by a Gerichtsreferendar. In the decision the Commission re-
ferred to the travaux prparatoires on art. 6 para. 3(c) which confirmed that the
word avocat (French text) was not to be understood in the technical sense of the
term but in the sense of "legal assistance."
38. "Application No. 604159" [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
236 (Individual Application).
39. "Application No. 646/59" [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
272 (Individual Application).
40. "X and Y Against Belgium" [1963] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
590 (Individual Application).
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The Convention also provides the right to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on behalf of the defense and the right
of cross-examination. 4' This right is intended to ensure the applica-
tion of the principle of "equality of arms," especially for the collec-
tion and the hearing of evidence. As regards the calling and interro-
gation of witnesses the accused should be placed on equal footing
with the public prosecutor.4 2  This does not mean that the accused
is allowed to call everyone, in particular, persons who are not in a
position to assist by their statements in elucidating the truth.48 One
must therefore consider whether the refused admittance of evidence
could have influenced the outcome of the proceedings.44 The court
can refuse to summon a witness who could not disprove the charges
against the accused,4" a witness whose evidence would have a bearing
only on facts subsequent to the offense,46 or a witness who was not
present at the events which constitute the charge against the ac-
cused.47
This portion of the Convention introduces into the European con-
tinental law the common law concept of "cross-examination," accord-
ing to which, in principle, only evidence given in public in the pres-
ence of the accused and subject to immediate cross-examination is
admissable. This privilege of the accused is one of the reasons why
courts under common law systems in criminal matters rarely request
the judges of another country to take evidence, especially by hearing
a person as a witness.4" In continental criminal procedure such
requests are, quite to the contrary, very common. Under this sys-
41. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6, para. 3(d).
42. "Ernest Weichert Against The Federal Republic of Germany" [1964]
Y.B. EUR. CONN. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 104, "X and the German Association of Z
Against the Federal Republic of Germany" Case, [1963] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 204; "X Against Belgium" Case, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 378 (Individual Applications).
43. "Application No. 753/60" [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
310 (Individual Application).
44. Supra note 16.
45. "Application No. 617/59" [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Individual Application).
46. "X Against Belgium", supra note 42.
47. "X Contre L'Autriche" [1965] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
175 (requetes Individuelles).
48. Another reason is that not the court but the parties are responsible for the
collection of evidence.
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tem, witnesses are heard in the requested state by the judge, normally
in the absence of the parties, i.e., the counsels for the prosecution and
the defense, because the procedure regarding legal assistance follows
generally the rules of the non-public preliminary investigation and
not the rules governing the public trial. In order to allow the parties
to the proceedings to assist at the hearing of the evidence abroad,
article 4 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters provides that:
On the request of the requesting Party the requested Party shall state the date and
place of execution of the letters rogatory. Officials and interested persons may be
present if the requested Party consents. 49
In cases where there was no possibility for the counsel for the defense
to assist at the hearing of the evidence abroad, the admissibility of
this evidence might be doubtful insofar as the right to cross-examina-
tion had not been respected. It might also be noted that an accused
is given the right to free assistance of an interpreter" and in addition
this right deals with a person "charged with criminal offense."'"
THE RESIDUAL MEANING OF "FAIR TRIAL"
THE CONCEPT IN GENERAL
Article 6 of the Convention, which deals with the concept of "prop-
er administration of justice,"52 is the basis of all trial safeguards
guaranteed by the Convention. In this context, the concept of a
"fair trial" procds equitable in article 6 para. 1, has gained an inde-
pendent and overriding meaning in the decisions of the European
Commission. It was in a private law case that the Commission first
held that:
the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6, par. 1 of the convention ap-
pears to contemplate that everyone who is a party to civil proceedings shall have
a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the Court under conditions which
do not place him under a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.53
49. [1959] EuRoP. T.S. No. 30.
50. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6, para. 3(e).
51. As to the procedural stage at which the accused can, at the earliest, be
considered as "charged," see text in/ra.
52. This is the term used in the official "Manual" of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights for the procedural rules contained in article 6.
53. "Application No. 434/58" [1959] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
354 (Decisions).
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Later, in the Nielsen case, 4 the European Commission, pointing to
the enumeration of certain specific "minimum rights" of article 6
para. 3, stressed the importance of the residual meaning of "fair
trial." It was stated that the six rights specifically enumerated are
not exhaustive, and that a trial may not conform to the general
standards of a "fair trial," even though these minimum rights-
guaranteed by para. 3 and also the right set forth in para. 2-have
been respected.
There are, of course, some limitations to this extensive interpre-
tation of this concept. The idea of a "fair trial" gives, for example,
no right to have the criminal proceedings conducted in a certain
manner.55 The right of the accused to a fair trial does not require
a court to base its decision on the statements of one party made
under oath,56 to hear a party "as a witness in his own case, ' 57 or to
refuse to hear a witness for the prosecution, who is guilty of having
committed the same offense as the accused."' It could, however, be
necessary that a court state in detail the reasons for its decision in
order that, on appeal from that decision, the defense might properly
be safeguarded.5"
The question of a possible violation of the general requirements
of a fair trial cannot be determined in abstracto but must be consid-
ered in the light of the special circumstances of each case on the
basis of a consideration of the trial as a whole. Accordingly, an
application concerning the right to be represented or assisted by prac-
ticing lawyers in proceedings before a labor court was declared in-
admissible6° because in the proceedings as a whole there was no de-
54. "Nielsen" Case, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 490 (case before
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
55. "Die Garantie fiir ein gerechtes Verfahren geit nicht von der Vorstellung
einer ganz bestimmien Ordnung des Verfahrens aus, welche in jedem Falle zu
verwirklichen wiire, sondern greift nur einzelne Prozessprinzipien heraus und erklirt
sie ffir verletzbar .... ." (Partsch, Die Rechte und Freiheiten der europiiischen
Menschenrechtskonvention, in "DIE GRUNDRECHTE," HANDBUCH DER THEORIE UND
PRAXIS DER GRUNDRECHTE, Berlin s. 384 (1966).
56. "X Against Sweden" [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
198 (Individual Applications).
57. "X Against Austria" [19621 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
210 (Individual Application).
58. Coll. 10 (1963) p. 5.
59. Coll. 10 (1963) p. 12.
60. "X and Y Against the Federal Republic of Germany" [19621 Y.B. EUR.
CONN. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 158 (Individual Application).
408 [Vol. XXI:397
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nial of justice. In extradition proceedings before a German court,
the European Commission, abstaining from answering whether article
6 para. 1 is applicable to extradition proceedings remarked that the
applicant had, in these extradition proceedings, "full opportunity to
present his case"61 and hence a fair trial. In several cases, the Euro-
pean Commission examined whether informing the jury of the ac-
cused's previous convictions before determining the issue of his guilt
was in conformity with article 6 para. 1 and 2.62 The European
Commission did not consider such procedure a violation of the Con-
vention, referring to "the (similar) practice in different countries
which are members of the Council of Europe.""3  In fact, in a trial
before an English court, one will never hear any mention of the
accused's past life before the conviction. But under the continental
system, the revelation of the accused's previous life history, even
before the conviction, does not normally serve in the determination
of the question of guilt, but only in the determination of sentence.
In certain cases, and in particular, in cases where laymen partici-
pate as jurors in the proceedings, the guarantees of article 6 para. 1
may be impaired by a virulent press campaign against the accused,
which "so influences public opinion and thereby the jurors, that the
hearing can no longer be considered to be a 'fair hearing' within the
meaning of Article 6 of the Convention."64
THE "FAIR TRIAL" AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
The fundamental principle of free judicial evaluation of evidence
must remain untouched. However, one could imagine that in very
exceptional circumstances evidence might be inadmissable according
to the concept of a "fair trial" or other articles of the Convention.
61. "X Against the Federal Republic of Germany" [1963] Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 462 (Individual Application). The question of the applicability
of art. 6 para. 1 to extradition proceedings is still open. One could argue, that extra-
dition is exclusively dealt with in art. 5, para. 1 (f).
62. See, e.g., Coll. 18, p. 44; "Against Austria" [1966] Y.B. EUR. CONV.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 550; "Y Against Denmark" [1965] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 370 (Individual Application).
63. Here we find one of the unfortunately rare examples where the Commis-
sion considered the "common standard" in Continental Europe. This standard
should be, for instance, kept in mind when evaluating the meaning of the "reason-
able time" in art. 5 para. 3 and art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
64. Coll. 11, p. 31.
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As to the use of the lie detector in a criminal investigation, the Aus-
trian Supreme Court has ruled that the interrogation of the accused
with the help of such means--even with the consent of the accused
-constitutes inadmissible evidence under article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention and the relevant provisions of the Austrian Code of
Criminal Proceedings, because the registration of unconscious and in-
voluntary modes of expression is likely to hinder the manisfestation
of the free will of the interrogated person." On the other hand,
the use of a tape recording of a private talk of the accused with a
co-defendant, which took place before the institution of the criminal
proceedings, as evidence in the trial has been admitted for considera-
tion on its merits."6 The case is still pending before the European
Commission.
THE PRINCIPLE OF "EQUALITY OF ARMS"
Only one aspect of the larger notion of "fair trial" is contained in
the principle of "equality of arms," according to which both parties
must have equal opportunity for presenting their arguments to the
court, at -least in writing, and to comment on their opponent's argu-
ments. The principle is, irrespective of the guarantees in article 6
para. 3, embodied in the concept of a "fair trial," as the European
Commission has held in the following cases: Ofner; Pataki; Hop-
finger; and Dunshirn v. Austria.
The Pataki and Dunshirn cases67 had been heard by the Austrian
Court of Appeals in closed session. Neither the accused nor his
lawyer were present, but the Chief Public Prosecutor addressed the
court. Austria had, as a consequence of the European Commission's
report, enacted a bill68 making available to applicants a new means of
access to the court. During an examination of these cases, the text of
the Austrian Code of Criminal Proceedings was amended by the
65. Published in the OSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG S. 445 (1967).
66. "Application No. 2645/65 Against Austria" decision of the Commis-
sion of October 3, 1969 (not published). The conversation had been recorded, un-
known to the accused, by the injured person in the presence of policemen.
67. "Pataki Against Austria; Dunshirn Against Austria" [1963] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 714 (cases before the Committee of Ministers).
68. Federal Law of March 27, 1963 concerning the reopening of Appeal Pro-
ceedings in Criminal Cases.
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federal law of July 18, 1962, in order to establish the principle of
equality of representation in proceedings before the court of appeals.
In Austria at the present time, these proceedings are no longer non-
public and conducted on the basis of documents only, but bilateral,
taking place in a public session. By resolution the Committee of
Ministers, expressing its satisfaction with these legislative measures,
decided that no further action was required in both cases. In a
judgment delivered on January 17, 1970 in the Delcourt case, the
European Court of Human Rights held that article 6 para. 1 "is in-
deed applicable to proceedings in cassation." 60 Delcourt's application
related to the presence of a member of the Procureur G6n6ral's de-
partment attached to the Belgian Court of Cassation at the delibera-
tions of the highest court of Belgium. The European Court examined
the issue not only in the light of the "equality of arms" concept, as
the European Commission did, but took into account article 6 para.
1 as a whole. It found that there had been no breach of the Con-
vention. While noting that certain considerations "may allow doubts
to arise about the satisfactory nature of the System in dispute,""0 it did
not find "the realities of the situation to be in any way in conflict
with this right" 71 to a fair hearing. They pointed out that the Pro-
cureur G~nfral's department at the Belgian Court of Cassation is not
a party to the case and enjoys complete independence from the Minis-
ter of Justice, nor is it the adversary of the accused whose conviction
or acquittal may lead to an appeal in cassation; as an "adjunct" or
an "adviser" of the Court of Cassation it "discharges a function of a
quasi-judicial nature"72 in assisting the court "to supervise the law-
fulness of the decisions attacked and to ensure the uniformity of ju-
dicial precedent. '7
3
69. "Delcourt Against Belgium" [1970] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. It has to be noted that in Afner Against "Application No. 524159;"
Hopfinger Against Austria "Application No. 617159" [1963] Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 679 (cases brought before the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe) the Commission and, following it, the Committee of
Ministers had examined the very similar role of the Austrian Procureur g6n6ral in
the proceedings of cassation. Here also, the Commission found no breach of the
principle of "equality of arms;" it considered that the Attorney-General (General
prokurator), in his written arguments filed before the decision of the Supreme
Court was passed (at a non-public session in which neither of the parties were
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The court applied the principle of "equality of arms" for the first
time in the Neumeister case. It held that the European Commission
had "rightly stated [this principle] to be included in the notion of a
fair trial," but it refused at the same time its application to pro-
ceedings for the examination of requests for provisional release. 74
The decisions on the "equality of arms" clearly reveal the problems
of a "transplantation" of certain legal concepts inherent to a system
of law based on the common law of England to quite different law
systems. It is clear that under common law the principle of equality
of arms is indispensable because criminal proceedings are conducted
mainly by the prosecution and defense without much influence by
the judge. The parties are responsible for submitting to the court
the necessary information and evidence, and for the direct, cross, and
redirect examination of witnesses called by them in order to prepare
the basis for the court's decision. Under this system, any inequality be-
tween prosecution and defense can lead to a false decision of the court.
Quite differently, under European legal systems influenced by the
French legislation of the nineteenth century, not only the judge, but
also the public prosecutor is an organ in the service of criminal jus-
tice and obliged to act with objectivity. For example, he is obliged,
under certain conditions, to appeal in favor of the accused.
THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL
The conditions under which criminal proceedings may be con-
ducted in the absence of the accused vary under the legislations of
the member states of the Council of Europe. 75  The conviction of an
accused in his absence is, from many points of view, less reliable than
a judgment delivered after both sides have been heard. There are
represented), simply expressed his concurrence with the report of the Judge
Rapporteur without trying to influence the decision to the disadvantage of the
accused. However, it was made clear that the equality of arms might have been
violated should the Attorney-General have played a more active part in the pro-
ceedings. Also in the Delcourt Case, the Attorney-General, before the decision of
the Court of Cassation was passed, had formulated "conclusions" in writing with-
out the accused having the possibility to answer. Here, the Court of Human
Rights rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded.
74. "Neumeister Against Austria" (1968) Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RiGHTs 813 (cases brought before the court).
75. The official publication Aspects of the International Validity of Criminal
Judgments of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 1968), contains a survey of the
legislations of the member states of the Council of Europe on this particular point.
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disadvantages in regard to the finding of the facts and to the deter-
mination of the sentence without any personal contact between the
judge and the accused. Under some legislations, a judgment may be
passed in absentia without the accused being aware at all of the
fact that criminal proceedings have been instituted against him. This
may be the case where personal service of summons is not prescribed,
and where the summons is deposited, for example, with the Registrar
of the court. The situation is still worse if the accused has no means
of appeal after his return against the judgment passed in absentia.
The right of the accused to be tried in his presence is, as such, not
guaranteed either by article 6 or by any other provision of the Con-
vention.76 The European Commission has, however, examined some
cases where the applicant was not present before the court and had
no opportunity to present his arguments to the court in writing. They
have expressed the opinion that the presence of a party to a civil
law case might be a necessary aspect of a fair hearing, either in the
general sense of a "fair trial" (article 6 para. 1) or on the basis of the
rights of the defense under article 6 para. 3 (c) and 3 (d) .77 In cer-
tain classes of cases, or in certain sets of circumstances, a "fair hear-
ing" is scarcely conceivable without the presence of the party con-
cerned. This is certainly true in criminal matters.78  However, the
question was not finally decided by the European Commission.
A violation of the Convention provisions can be disregarded if the
accused's ignorance of the date of the hearing was due to the fact that
he had himself failed to keep the court informed of his exact ad-
dress,79 or if the accused was represented by a lawyer of his own
choice, or, under certain circumstances, had one appointed by the
court.8 0 However, a lawyer appointed by the court will not be able
to prepare the defense properly when he has no chance to contact
76. Coll. 6, p. 55; supra note 53.
77. Supra note 53. Subparagraph (b) of para. 3 of article 6 of the Conven-
tion could also be involved.
78. "Against Federal Republic of Germany", supra note 19.
79. "Against the Netherlands" [1962] Y.B. EuR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
262. In general, the court can deny a "fair hearing" only if the accused
is ready to be heard by the court and the court refuses to hear him. This is not
the case if the accused does not comply with a summons or if he is fugitive in order
to avoid the proceedings. In that case it is the accused himself who wilfully
causes a situation which makes a hearing in his presence impossible.
80. Coll. 23, p. 31; Coll. 28, p. 43.
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the absent accused in order to obtain the necessary information. In
such cases, the chances of incorrect findings of fact are very great and
the trial should not be properly called "fair." Nevertheless, whether
or not a trial conducted in the absence of the accused was fair or
not must be considered on the basis of the conditions of the trial as a
whole, and therefore it must be done on a case-by-case basis.
The question is of importance also for the law of extradition. A
state could hesitate to grant extradition-or even feel it must deny it
-for the serving of a sentence imposed by a judgment in absentia,
if the sentenced person was not able to make use of the rights of
defense mentioned in article 6 para. 3 of the Convention, and if
there is no remedy available against the judgment."' The circum-
stances, which make it difficult for the requested state to grant extra-
dition, may arise under article 3 of the Convention. One could argue
that this provision excludes extradition when the person to be extra-
dited will be or-in the case of a conviction-has been deprived by
the authorities of the requesting state of all or some of the rights
guaranteed by article 6 of the Convention.
THE RIGHT TO A HEARING WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT
Contrary to the majority of the European Codes of Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 2 there is a provision in the Convention by which criminal
proceedings may not last beyond a reasonable time. 8 On the other
hand, according to the Convention, the court is obliged to safeguard
the rights of defense and to decide the question of guilt only after
all possibilities of finding the whole truth have been exhausted. Very
often, therefore, there will be a conflict between these requirements
of criminal proceedings. Any compromise between them may not be
to the detriment of the rights of defense or the finding of the truth.
It was, therefore, not surprising when the European Court of
81. The Netherlands has made a reservation to this effect in respect to article 1
of the European Convention on Extradition. [1957] EUROP. T.S. No. 24.
82. No limitations of the duration of the proceedings as such, but of the deten-
tion on remand are, however, known in some European national legislations, e.g.,
in Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.
83. This part of art. 6 para. 1 is certainly influenced by the idea of a "speedy
trial" within the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.
414 [Vol. XXI:397
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human Rights in the Neumeister case held that there had been
no violation of article 6 para. 1 as regards the length of the pro-
ceedings."4 The reasons given by the court are very important from
the point of view of the procedural laws of the continental European
countries. The court approved the procedural system in force on the
continent of Europe according to which judges are responsible for
the investigation and the conduct of the trial, and obliged them to
take every measure likely to throw light on the truth or falsity
of the charges (Grundsatz der amtswegigen Wahrheitserforschung).
The court stated further that a concern for speed should not relieve
judges from the observation of this principle. "It is obvious," the
court added, "that the delays in opening and reopening the hearing
were in large part caused by the need to give the legal representatives
of the parties, and also the judges sitting on the case, time to ac-
quaint themselves with the case record." 5
The term "reasonable time" provided for in article 6 para. 1 (delay
in bringing to trial), just like the same term in article 5 para. 3,
must be determined in the light of the concrete facts of each case.
The European Commission had applied in the Neumeister case
mutatis mutandis, the seven criteria developed for the interpretation
of the term "reasonable time" within the meaning of article 5 para.
3,86 and also in connection with the meaning of article 6 para. 1.
As the court has not accepted the European Commission's "criteria"
theory, this method of interpretation has not proved to be a suitable
one. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings, therefore,
may not be judged in the light of certain abstract criteria but only in
connection with the nature of the proceedings, the complexity of the
case, and any particular difficulties met by the investigating authori-
ties. For example, it is not possible to hold the judicial authorities
of the respondent government responsible for the difficulties they
have encountered abroad in obtaining the execution of their letters
rogatory. 87
84. Supra note 74.
85. Supra note 74 at 815. As to the fundamental differences between European
continental law and common law which the Commission had not taken into con-
sideration in its report of May 27, 1966. This decision of the court has helped to
avoid this principle to be degraded to a mere formal and fictive function.
86. See text inf ra.
87. Supra note 74.
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THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
In the Neumeister case, there was some discussion between the
European Commission and the Austrian government as to the pro-
cedural stage at which the period of reasonable time referred to in
article 6 para. 1 begins and ends. This provision emphatically does
not concern the period that elapses between the offense and the
charges."8 In Neumeister, the European Commission concluded that
the revelant stage was that "at which the situation of the person con-
cerned has been substantially affected as a result of a suspicion
against him."8" Accordingly, the European Commission chose as a
"starting point" a day on which the applicant had been informally
heard by the investigation judge," long before the formal opening of
the preliminary investigation. It was obvious that the applicant was
at that time not yet "charged with a criminal offense" under Austrian
law in the sense referred to in article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
The court could therefore not follow the European Commission's
opinion and choose as a starting point the first interrogation of the
applicant after the opening of the "preliminary investigation,"'"
nearly one year later.
THE END OF THE PERIOD
The problem of the period's final point was considered by the
European Commission, and by the court, but was not finally solved.
In the Neumeister report the European Commission held that the
time referred to in article 6 para. 1 "is not interrupted by the opening
of the trial of the accused, but runs at least until the judgment has
88. "Against Austria" Case, [19621 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 270
(Individual Applications).
89. Supra note 74.
90. The legal basis of this interrogation was article 38(3) of the AUSTRIAN CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
91. "Voruntersuchung" AUSTRIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS art. 91-112.
Even this timing may give rise to objections. Here again we see the difficulties of
transferring-mutatis mutandis-the ideas of a "speedy trial" to legal systems not
based on the English common law: English criminal proceedings do not already
begin with the investigation conducted by the prosecution. In this early stage the
person concerned may not yet invoke the right to a hearing within reasonable time.
Proceedings do not start until the "issue process" by the judge. This "commitment
for trial" may be compared with the formal indictment ("Anklageerhebung") in
continental law after closing of the investigation.
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been rendered by the court of the first instance."9  The European
Commission did not find it necessary to decide, in the Neumeister
case, whether or to what extent appeal proceedings were also covered
by that period. The European Court of Human Rights was in its
Neumeister judgment of June 27, 1968 more precise. It pointed out
that article 6 para. 1 indicated as a final point the judgment deter-
mining the charge and stated that this might be a decision given by an
appeal court "when such a court pronounces upon the merits of the
charge.""3  Also in the Wemhoff judgment of June 27, 1968, the
court referred to a conviction or an acquittal even though such de-
cision was rendered by an appeal court.94
Normally, the period will end with the judgment rendered by the
court of first instance, because it is only this judgment that is based
on the merits of the charge. It is the duty of the appeal court to
decide whether the judgment of the court of first instance is correct
and in conformity with the law. The answer to the question will
finally depend on the nature and purposes of the appeal or the plea
of nullity.
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WHO IS DETAINED ON REMAND
An accused detained on remand95 has, apart from the rights of
everyone charged with a criminal offense under article 6, additional
rights in order to safeguard his rights to liberty and security. Article
5 para. 1 (c) defines the reasons allowing arrest and detention, but
does not mention the authorities entitled to issue a warrant of arrest.90
92. Supra note 74.
93. Supra note 74.
94. "Wemhoff Against the Federal Republic of Germany" [1968] Y.B.
CONv. ON HUMAN RiGTrrs 796 (cases brought before the court).
95. The European Committee on Crime Problems has discussed the questions
concerning detention on remand in connection with the Convention (Doc. DPC/
CEPC (64) 14). The resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers' Dele-
gates expressed the view that detention on remand should be regarded as an ex-
ceptional measure and should be ordered or continued only when it is "strictly
necessary." Reports of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations
concerning the Right to Personal Freedom (cf. of Jan. 9, 1961, E/CN. 4/1813, p. 65
et. seq., and of Jan. 5, 1962, E/CN. 4/826, p. 67 et. seq.) reflect the very divergent
views that exist as regards particularly the length of detention permissible from the
points of view of the protection of Human Rights.
96. As a rule, only judicial authorities will be competent. ANDRIOLI, LA CON-
VENZIONE EUROPEA DEi DRIrrI DELL' UOMO E IL PROCESSO GIusTo (Temi romana,
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The grounds on which detention on remand is based must continue
during the whole period of detention. Otherwise, the accused must
be released pending trial.
The arrested person shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him.9 7  This information is not necessarily as specific and
detailed as the information under article 6 para. 3(a).11 The Con-
vention does not require that the reasons for the arrest be either set
out in the text of the decision authorizing the detention99 or be given
in writing.x00
Under article 5 para. 3, "everyone arrested or detained in acord-
ance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c)" of that article "shall
be entitled," inter alia, "to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial;" it is also provided that "release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial." According to the practice of the
European Commission, the exact significance of the words "reason-
able time," a term which is vague and lacking in precision, can be
judged only in the light of the facts of the case, not in abstracto. In
order to facilitate this evaluation, the European Commission had
developed in its report of May 28, 1966, in the Neumeister case, seven
criteria according to which each individual case should be exam-
ined. 101 The opinion of the European Commission in a particular case
1964) refers to the "disinteresse esternato dalla Convenzione per l'identificazione
di coloro, che sono legittimati ad apportare limitazioni alla liberta personale."
97. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5, para. 2.
98. Supra note 18.
99. "X Against the Netherlands" [19661 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTs 474 (Individual Applications).
100. "X Against the Netherlands" [19621 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 224 (Individual Applications).
101. These criteria or "elements" which influenced the Commission also in the
Wemhoff case (supra note 94), were: (1) The actual length of detention;
(2) the length of detention on remand in relation to the nature of the offense, the
penalty prescribed and to be expected in case of a conviction and any legal pro-
visions making allowance for such period of detention in the execution of the pen-
alty which may be imposed; (3) material, moral or other effects on the detained
person; (4) the conduct of the accused; (5) difficulties in the investigation of the
case (its complexity in respect of facts or number of witnesses or co-accused, need
to obtain evidence abroad, etc.); (6) the manner in which the investigation was
conducted (the system of investigation applicable and the conduct by the authorities
of the investigation); (7) the conduct of the judicial authorities concerned in
dealing with applications for release pending trial and in completing the trial.
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would then be the result of an evaluation of these criteria in toto.
The European Court of Human Rights did not follow this method
applied by the European Commission and objected to by the respon-
dent governments in the cases of Neumeister and Wemhoff. It is
rather, the court stated, "on the basis of the reasons given in the
decisions on the applications for release pending trial, and of the
true facts (faits non controuv~s) mentioned by the applicant in his
appeals, that the court is called upon to decide whether or not there
has been a violation of the Convention.' °2 The court repeated this
view in the Stogmuller and Matznetter cases. 103 In the Stogmuller
case, the court clarified its position and reserved its right
to consider and assess the reasonableness of the grounds which persuaded the judi-
cial authorities to decide . . . on this serious departure from the rules of respect for
individual liberty and of the presumption of innocence which is involved in every
detention without a conviction.104
Referring to a decision of the competent Austrian Court of Appeals
which had denied, in the last instance, the applicant's release on the
assumption that he would continue to commit offenses of the same
nature, the European Court of Human Rights held, contrary thereto,
after having evaluated the facts, "that the existence of a danger of
repetition of the offenses could not be upheld under the circumstanc-
es of the case." The period of detention spent afterward, was there-
fore, not "reasonable" in the view of the court. Thus, the European
Court of Human Rights found itself in exactly the situation which
the constant practice of the European Commission' had tried to
avoid: an international jurisdiction reconsidering-both as to the
facts and as to the law-a national judicial decision and interpreting
municipal legislation in a field specifically reserved to the prerogative
of judicial discretion, thus sitting as a court of last instance in all
questions of maintenance of detention. It apparently is not the ob-
102. Judgment of the Court June 27, 1968 in the Neumeister case (supra
note 62). ("As to the law," para. 5); in the same sense judgment June 27, 1968 in
the Wemhojf case (supra note 94).
103. Judgments November 10, 1969.
104. "Stogmiiller" [1969] Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 364 (cases
brought before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
105. "Against Austria" [1965] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 190
(Individual Applications). "It rests primarily with domestic courts to inter-
pret municipal legislation, even in fields in which the non-observance of such legis-
lation constitutes a violation of the Convention. The Commission merely exer-
cises a supervisory function in this regard and must exercise it prudently."
1971] 419
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ject of article 5 para. 3, which does not deal with the reasons for
detention, to create such an additional competence. The danger of
this method consists in leading the supervising jurisdiction to deny
the existence of an obviously continuing reason for the detention, e.g.,
the danger of flight, only because it has come to the conclusion that
the length of detention is no longer reasonable. The risk of a direct
confrontation between the decisions of the national and the inter-
national jurisdiction would certainly seem to be increased by such
actions on the part of the international body.
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